I. Introduction

In the wake of the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban’s resurgence precipitated an unprecedented, violent erosion of women ’s and girls’ rights in the country, compelling women’s resistance movements to operate within increasingly restricted physical and digital spaces.[1] The documentary film “Shot the Voice of Freedom” is a powerful cinematic record that offers an intimate look at the women’s resistance movement in Afghanistan, following the Taliban’s return to power.[2] Directed by Zainab Entezar, the film follows two sisters, Reshmin and her unnamed sibling, as they navigate the dangerous landscape of protest and activism under Taliban rule, always at an incredible personal cost. The documentary depicts how the women’s resistance movement in Afghanistan has adapted to the harsh restrictions imposed by the Taliban by leveraging digital platforms, particularly WhatsApp, to organise and coordinate their efforts. In the documentary, we see that they plan and coordinate protests, share information and strategies, maintain communication networks, and document and disseminate evidence of Taliban oppression through the WhatsApp platform.

We see how WhatsApp has become the principal coordination tool for women’s rights defenders in Afghanistan, facilitating the organisation, documentation, and mobilisation of protests against Taliban restrictions. Through encrypted messaging, group chats, and real-time communication features, the platform enables the exercise of key human rights enshrined under international law – notably the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association protected under various international human rights law instruments.[3] However, as the experiences of Reshmin and her sister demonstrate, these same features, operating within WhatsApp’s standardised privacy policies and data governance frameworks, create acute vulnerabilities for human rights defenders when confronted with authoritarian surveillance capabilities. This paper focuses on this paradoxical aspect of the relationship between digital platforms and human rights; specifically the former’s capacity to both empower and undermine the same set of human rights. The same digital platforms that enable resistance simultaneously, counter-intuitively and conversely expose defenders to heightened risks of state persecution.

Towards the end of the film, we see forced confessions of the same activists depicted in the film in various local and international news reports. This highlights a disturbing tactic employed by the Taliban to suppress dissent and intimidate activists which aligns with the broader, disturbing, and systematic patterns of human rights abuses documented in Afghanistan, at least since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. As explored in the film, the Taliban’s use of forced confessions serves several purposes. By compelling human rights defenders to “confess” that they were acting illegally and immorally, were influenced by outside (Western) forces or seeking asylum, the Taliban attempts to discredit and undermine the legitimacy of the entire women’s rights movement and resistance in Afghanistan as foreign and alien to indigenous local cultural norms, whose prescripts this paper will not address to a substantial degree. Instead, it seeks to problematise the effect  of political repression and not the content of those socialised (to the extent that they are) patriarchal gender norms and expectations, crystallised as rights repression, oppression and systematic denial of personhood, dignity, socio-cultural and political relevance in so far as these invariably relate to impact and equal participation.

 Of course, it goes without saying that the same technique of  state centric tech-totalitarianism does not seem to apply equally as much to those understood as cishet male in the culture and that differentiation does not merely function as inequity or even unequal treatment but a ‘de-voicing’ and delegitimization of the female struggle for equality as non-indigenous, however damning this may be for any claims to authentic and self-contained legitimacy of what is then or now understood and socio-politically constructed as true/natural and indigenous gender roles. It bears noting that this is not a criticism of Afghan culture itself but a means of noting legal and securitised artifice for what is ostensibly an ideological claim. What presents itself as the dilemma of  corporate techno neutrality to social, cultural and political claims is the position of big tech in positioning conduct that is essentially omission or restraint ( more charitably understood). However, these too are an ideological position and companies are not divorced from the social milieu or  the human condition and connection they seek to engender as a stated aim. It is by making this point that in fact intervention is not divergent of their policy as we seek to politicise and problematise, neutrality, objectivity, non-racialism , non-sexism and non-intervention as themselves policy stances and therein the call or move to act in the form of regulation and protocols on disclosure that would have a view to the rights of the end-user as the subject with inherent subjectivity and not an ends to profit or, better read, the increase of influence.

These forced confessions, which we learned later in an interview with the director, were under threat and actual use of violence – physical, political, and psycho-emotional violence.[4] Here, the Taliban sought to intimidate and terrorise not only the individuals’ human rights defenders involved in the protests and resistance but also the wider Afghan women community. It is also a form of propaganda, with the Taliban releasing heavily edited videos of these forced confessions to shape public perception in their favour.[5]

These forced confessions witnessed in the film are consistent with reports from various human rights organisations. For instance, Human Rights Watch,[6] Amnesty International[7] and various United Nations agencies[8]have documented cases where detained women protesters were coerced into making false confessions. The women were compelled to state that they were not working for human rights but were instead motivated by the prospect of evacuation or influenced by people outside the country.[9] This practice is part of a broader pattern of repression against women’s rights activists in Afghanistan, where the Taliban employs various tactics to silence dissent and quell women’s resistance, including arbitrary arrests, physical violence, threats against family members, and, to the point of this discussion, State digital surveillance to undercut resistance movements.[10] Whilst it could be said that a likening to this state violence to the witch hunts of medieval Europe may be hyperbole but it is to be noted that the same impetus of women as agents of a darker external entity remains at play here. This is a functioning and foundational logic of heterosexist patriarchy in the alienation of women and girl children from the family- as predestined for outsiders and so the internal policing, ostracization from rights bearing-hood and alienation of women begins to make sense, as it were, in the patriarchal familial structure that informs the public consciousness and now or then political project to protect that original structure.

It remains unclear how exactly the Taliban gathers the intelligence required to coerce these activists into forced confessions, however, in an interview with the director, Entezar, it became clear that the Taliban relied on user data, including WhatsApp data to identify and apprehend the protestors, and force confessions.[11] The mechanisms through which authoritarian actors such as the Taliban can access WhatsApp data for forced confessions reveal critical vulnerabilities in platform architecture and data governance frameworks.

Primary access was through direct device seizure, exploiting WhatsApp’s fundamental data design principles that, as stated in their Privacy Policy, “messages are stored on your device,”[12] and possible through the exploitation of WhatsApp’s legal and policy infrastructure. The documentary demonstrates how device seizures provide access not only to stored communications but also to crucial metadata about organisational structures and resistance networks, all stored on local devices. The film demonstrates that these infrastructure arrangements (both technical and legal), while necessary for service functionality in stable, democratic environments,  create immediate and compelling vulnerabilities for human rights defenders when met with State surveillance, or when physical devices fall under authoritarian control. It remains to be seen whether the move to ‘disappearing messages’ on the platform form any kind of protection when post fact  or physical ( device held) decryption may still operate to decode private communication.

These primary vulnerabilities are compounded by WhatsApp’s legal governance framework, which inadvertently creates additional access points for State actors. While Meta (WhatsApp’s parent Company) may not officially recognise Taliban authority, the regime’s control of Afghan State institutions and machinery enables exploitation of what Meta privacy policy terms “applicable law or regulations, legal process, or government requests.”[13] This often creates a paradoxical situation in which platform policies designed to ensure legal compliance in democratic contexts become instruments of repression under authoritarian control. The documentary reveals how these legal and technical mechanisms can be systematically exploited to legitimise user data access by the State, which in this case was employed to coerce activists into forced confession in violation of human rights.[14]

WhatsApp’s legal and policy framework, while designed for standard operating environments, creates significant vulnerabilities for rights defenders in conflict zones, such as Afghanistan. These challenges emerge from the intersection of platform governance, legal compliance obligations, embedded power dynamics and cross-border data flows. Moreover, while WhatsApp’s architecture incorporates significant privacy protections which hold up in most contexts, its technical infrastructure contains inherent vulnerabilities that can compromise rights defenders in high-risk environments, such as resistance movements in Afghanistan. These vulnerabilities emerge from the platform’s core operational requirements and data practices, as detailed in both its Terms of Service[15] and Privacy Policy.[16] I explore these in more detail in this paper.

This tension emerges from the fundamental misalignment between WhatsApp’s platform governance – designed primarily for stable, democratic environments with functioning legal systems – and the realities of human rights defense in conflict or high-risk zones such as Afghanistan. As I explore in this paper, WhatsApp’s privacy policies and terms of service, while ostensibly protective, can inadvertently compromise human rights defenders through data governance arrangements and measures designed for democratic contexts.[17] As I observe more broadly, the platform’s corporate responsibility framework, guided by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework (“UNGPs”),[18] struggles to reconcile universal service provisions with the specific needs of users operating under authoritarian surveillance. Context as purposive to user experience ought to be the operating model for functioning global enterprise such as these, however, it is the universal and uniform transplantation of data protection mechanisms that is at issue. In an increasingly complex and diverse world it is , I propose, in the interest of companies to bear this difference in their policy-making, much the same way that algorithms specialize user experiences, so too must policy follow this approach.  The problem lies in the assumption of a set of values, or rather the admission to the responsibility to embody open and democratic values that appears to be anathema to Silicone Valley dictum. Here I note the lack of diversity in the institutional culture of companies in the failure to problematize these user’s/ activists/ and human experiences with their interface. Perhaps therein lies the greater problem.

When Taliban forces violently suppress physical protests, as depicted in several harrowing scenes, the platform provides crucial coordination capabilities for emergency responses and documentation.[19] Yet, these same communication patterns, preserved through WhastApp’s data policies, create digital evidence that authorities exploit variously through device seizure, legal demands, or surveillance technologies. This paradox exemplifies the broader challenges of protecting digital rights under authoritarian regimes, where standard platform policies can themselves be transformed into instruments of oppression.

Drawing on existing international human rights law, WhatsApp’s platform governance framework (privacy policy and terms of service), and the documentary film, this paper examines the complex relationship between digital platforms like WhatsApp and human rights protection in high risk or conflict zones. Through analysis of WhatsApp’s role in Afghan women’s resistance, the paper aims to reveal how corporate policy decisions and arrangements intersect with State surveillance capabilities in repressive jurisdictions to create both opportunities and vulnerabilities for human rights defenders – turning tools of resistance into tools of oppression.

The paper proceeds in several sections. The first section analyses WhatsApp’s role as an enabler of human rights, examining how platform architecture and features seen through its Privacy Policy and Terms of Use – including encryption, group organisation capabilities, and documentation mechanisms – facilitate the exercise of fundamental rights in restricted, repressive or high risk environments. Second, the analysis then shifts to a critical examination of the platform’s paradox, investigating how these same policy and technical features create vulnerabilities for human rights defenders through data retention, device linkage, and metadata exposure. Third, the paper establishes the applicable theoretical and intenational legal framework, examining the scope of responsibility for both States and corporate actors in the protection of international human rights, with particular attention to the UNGPs, Privacy and data protection, and their application to WhatsApp’s platform governance. This section also examines the complex power dynamics between platform providers, State actors, and rights defenders, revealing how corporate governance decisions and State surveillance capabilities meet to create specific challenges for human rights defenders. The section concludes by identifying critical protection gaps in current international legal frameworks.

Through this analysis, this paper argues that protecting digital rights in authoritarian contexts requires a fundamental and nuanced reconsideration of platform governance frameworks and approaches. The experiences documented in Shot the Voice of Freedom demonstrate that standard approaches to data protection and privacy, designed for democratic contexts, while appropriate for stable democratic jurisdictions, can become vectors of rights violations in repressive environments. The paper contributes to emerging scholarship on digital rights by demonstrating how this paradoxical relationship has crucial implications for both corporate policy and international human rights legal responses in high risk or conflict environments, as digital platforms increasingly become essential tools for human rights defence in these environments. In the final section, I synthesises key findings, to propose recommendations for strengthening existing human rights protection in the context of WhatsApp and other digital platforms, addressing platform governance modifications, legal framework development, and enhanced protection mechanisms, while also reflecting on future challenges in the evolving rights landscape.

Before we get into the discussion, I note that the film is further unique in its production approach, being created entirely through low-cost digital devices like smartphones. This method not only ensured the authenticity of the film and its stories but also serves as a form of resistance in itself, allowing the filmmaker to capture raw, unfiltered moments of the women’s lives and struggles while minimising the risk of detection.

   II. WhatsApp as an Enabler of Human Rights

The role of WhatsApp in facilitating human rights advocacy and democratic discourse has been emphasized by its CEO, Will Cathcart. In an interview with the Committee to Protect Journalists, Cathcart articulated the platform’s commitment to secure communication as a cornerstone of democratic freedoms.[20] He framed WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption features not merely as a technical specification, but as a vital safeguard for democracy itself. (But also, the company’s entire business model rests on this encryption.) Cathcart’s and the company’s stance reflects a growing recognition of digital platforms’ significance in protecting human rights, particularly in contexts where traditional democratic institutions are weak or under threat.

In the interview, he argues that WhatsApp’s secure communication services are essential for:

 “journalists being able to talk to each other, and [to] sources, [to] bring out critical stories on governments or companies is a fundamental element of a democracy. We believe, in democracy, you need to have opposition. We believe human rights defenders all around the world do really, really important work. WhatsApp is popular in a lot of countries around the world that don’t have as robust traditions of freedom and liberal democracy. We’re popular in a lot of places where the ability to communicate securely is critical to someone’s safety.”[21]

While this perspective aligns with broader trends in digital rights advocacy, which increasingly views encrypted communication as a fundamental component of freedom of expression and association in the digital age,[22] it has faced challenges from governments and State actors seeking to implement “backdoors” for law enforcement access, a proposal the company has thus far strongly opposed. Cathcart’s characterization of government-proposed security backdoors as “a threat to democracy” reflects the platform’s self-conception as a critical infrastructure for rights defenders, journalists, and opposition movements, especially in jurisdictions lacking robust democratic traditions.[23]

A.   Whatsapp’s Platform Architecture and the exercise of Human Rights

In this section I examine how WhatsApp’s policy and technical architecture function to enable the exercise of key human rights, with a particular focus on restricted environments such as in the women’s resistence movement in Afghanistan. The documentary film Shot the Voice of Freedom demonstrates how Afghan women’s rights defenders leverage digital technologies such as WhatApp to exercise fundamental rights protected under international law, including freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, ssociation, and data privacy.[24]

Whatsapp enables Afghan women to share and receive information and ideas, both of which find protection under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). By using WhatsApp, Afghan women’s rights defenders can seek, receive, and impart information, which is part of the right to freedom of expression[25] and more crucially political participation as these too are an expression of the national aspiration of its polis or politeia. In terms of freedom of association, the app allows women’s rights defenders and the resistance movement to form and participate in groups to pursue common interests, a right enshrined variously under international and regional law, including Article 20 of the UDHR and Article 22 of the ICCPR. These rights are closely related to the right to participate in public affairs. The severity of gender-based restrictions under Taliban rule represents an extraordinary violation of fundamental human rights protected under international law, particularly the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The systematic exclusion of women from public life has reached such extremes that, as one human rights observer grimly notes, “a female cat in Afghanistan has more freedom than a woman”¹. While metaphorical, this stark comparison illuminates the profound degradation of women’s rights in post-2021 Afghanistan, where basic freedoms of movement, association, and public participation—rights guaranteed under Articles 15 and 16 of the CEDAW to name a few—have been systematically eliminated through Taliban edicts.[26] Here, WhatsApp facilitates women’s engagement in political and social issues, a right recognised in Article 21 of the UDHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR.

1.     WhatsApp End-to-End Encryption and User Privacy

Moreover, Whatsapp’s terms of service and privacy policy promises to facilitate the exercise of these rights under the umbrella of privacy and data protections.[27] WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption is designed to protect users’ private communications, aligned with Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 of the ICCPR. End-to-end encryption emerges as a foundational enabler of human rights exercises in repressive contexts. As affirmed by the former UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, David Kaye, encryption is essential for securing “the right to freedom of opinion and expression in the digital age.”[28] The platform’s implementation of end-to-end encryption provides what the Terms of Service describe as protection “against us and third parties from reading them [messages].”[29] This pieceof technical architecture creates protected digital spaces for human rights defenders to communicate, plan, and organise.

As seen in the documentary film, this enables Afghan women to engage in protected communication despite pervasive state surveillance. As one activist explains in the film, encrypted messaging becomes the primary means of coordinating resistance activities while minimising exposure. This aligns with the Human Rights Committee’s recognition that privacy is essential for realising freedom of expression and opinion.[30] Moreover, privacy and data protections find international law protection variously under international human rights law, including Article 12 of the UDHR, Article 17 of the ICCPR, and Article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. At the regional level, privacy protections are guaranteed variously under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Articles 16 and 21 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights and Article 19 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.

Privacy and data protections are also essential components of protest rights, and the chilling effect of State surveillance on the freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression has been recognised by various authoritative bodies. For instance, the UN Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”) has identified several surveillance practices that may inhibit these fundamental rights, including the intimidating use of recording devices during assemblies or protests, data gathering by authorities in connection with assemblies or protests, and the deployment of surveillance technologies that instill fear of future repercussions, stigmatisation[31] or even reprisal by actors outside of the state. This is an endangerment as the vertical and horizontal level, This concern extends to the digital realm, as evidenced by the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in Big Brother Watch v UK, which acknowledged that bulk interception of journalists’ communications could have a detrimental impact on freedom of expression.[32] At the national level, the London Policing Ethics Panel has highlighted the potential of surveillance to stifle democratic debate and protest.[33]Furthermore, in R (on the application of Edward Bridges), the England and Wales Court of Appeal recognised that surveillance could disproportionately interfere with the right to privacy, underscoring the intricate relationship between privacy and the exercise of other fundamental rights.[34] These various perspectives collectively emphasise the need for careful consideration of State surveillance practices in the context of protest rights and human rights. The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of assembly has also emphasised that surveillance and data collection related to protests must comply with privacy protections under international human rights law, specifically the ICCPR.[35]

2.     Group Organisation Capabilities

WhatsApp’s group functionality provides critical infrastructure for collective organisation and assembly, particularly in contexts where physical gatherings are restricted or dangerous, as is the case in Afghanistan. The platform’s “groups and broadcast lists” feature, as described in its privacy policy, enables several key aspects of rights exercise that are fundamental to modern protest movements and civil society organisations.[36] The Group functionality facilitates horizontal organisation structures, rapid information dissemination, collective decision-making, resource coordination and at times emergency response networks.[37]

These capabilities align closely with the essential elements of the right to freedom of assembly as articulated in international human rights law. Specifically, Article 21 of the ICCPR protects the right of peaceful assembly, which the UN Human Rights Committee has interpreted to include digitally-mediated assemblies in its General Comment No. 37 on the same Article.[38] The Committee emphasises here that States have positive obligations to facilitate peaceful assemblies, including those conducted online. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights (“EctHR”) has also recognised the importance of digital tools for exercising assembly rights. In Cengiz and Others v. Turkey for instance, the Court held that blocking access to YouTube violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, acknowledging the platform’s role in transmitting information of specific interest.[39] WhatsApp’s group functionality similarly provides critical infrastructure for collective organisation and assembly. Accordingly, the documentary film centres around how Afghan women’s rights defenders and activists utilise these capabilities to organise protests, coordinate responses to repression, and maintain movement cohesion despite severe physical restrictions. Broader, is the public interest and the inter-connected or interrelated rights of individuals and groups and therein State encroachment points to a greater erosion in political freedom more generally.

3.     Documentation and Evidence Preservation

Moreover, the platform’s media sharing and storage capabilities enable crucial documentation of human rights violations. WhatsApp’s architecture allows users to share photo and video evidence, forward and preserve documentation, create evidence chains, maintain temporal records, and archive movement activities through the historic chat string.[40] In Shot the Voice of Freedom, the director demonstrates how activists use these features to document Taliban violations, including through the film itself, creating what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and other leading scholars have termed “digital evidence” of rights violations.[41] This documentation capability transforms individual witnesses into systematic human rights monitors, as seen in the film itself, which is created entirely using a compilation of cellphone-generated and shared video content.

Finally, WhatsApp’s technical and policy architecture enables rapid network building and information dissemination crucial for rights movements. The film shows how Afghan women leverage these capabilities to build international solidarity networks, share information about rights violations, and maintain movement momentum despite legally mandated physical isolation. This aligns with the HRC’s recognition that digital technologies are essential for modern human rights advocacy.[42]

B.    WhatsApp’s Platform Policies Supporting Human Rights Protection

WhatsApp’s policy architecture incorporates several mechanisms designed to protect user rights, although, their effectiveness in repressive environments like Afghanistan requires critical examination. The platform’s policies reflect WhatsApp’s “strong privacy and security principles,” which manifest through multiple protective layers. I unpack only the key measures below.

1.     Privacy Protection Measures

As intimated earlier, WhatsApp’s core privacy protection framework centres on end-to-end encryption, which the privacy policy emphasises as fundamental stating; “your personal messages and calls are end-to-end encrypted. No one else, not even WhatsApp, can read or listen to them.”[43] This technical architecture creates protected spaces for rights defenders, though with notable limitations and exceptions. This privacy architecture includes several key mechanisms. First is message privacy; the policy provides that “[w]e do not retain your messages in the ordinary course of providing our Services.” Instead, messages are “stored on your device and not typically stored on our servers.”[44]This architecture theoretically protects communication privacy, although the qualification “typically” signals important exceptions, with important implications. More on this in the next section. Second is data minimisation; here WhatsApp employs what it terms “data minimisation principles,” exemplified by the policy that messages are “deleted from our servers” once delivered. However, notably, the platform retains undelivered messages “in encrypted form on our servers for up to 30 days,” no-doubt creating potential vulnerabilities, although these may be minimal.

2.     Security Features

The platform implements multiple security measures that the terms of service describe as working “to protect the safety, security, and integrity of our Services.” These key security features include account verification[45] and unauthorised access prevention. The terms demand that users are “responsible for keeping your device and your WhatsApp account safe and secure,” and must “notify us promptly of any unauthorised use or security breach.”[46]However, as the film shows how these platform security measures can be easily compromised through device seizure, resulting in very serious implications. This responsibilisation on the consumer functions to exempt WhatsApp from responsibility and therein any form of liability, however fragile, for rights violations of a severe degree such as seen here.

Lastly, WhatsApp implements several user protection mechanisms, although their effectiveness varies in high-risk contexts like Agfhanistan. These protective measures interact with Meta’s broader data practices. The privacy policy highlights that “WhatsApp receives information from, and shares information with, the Meta Companies.” This integration, while designed for service improvement, creates potential vulnerabilities through cross-platform data aggregation.  Creating a ripple of a chilling effect as surveillance does precisely that, surveys users across various platforms to determine interest and activity functioning as a kind of integrated backdoor.

As evidenced in the film, WhatsApp’s institutional commitment to security through encryption creates complex tensions when confronted with State surveillance capabilities that exploit other platform vulnerabilities. A critical reading of Whatsapp’s Privacy Policy and Terms of Service reveals tensions between these boilerplate standard privacy protection and high-risk, conflict zone requirements. While the platform’s architecture incorporates important protective measures, the documentary evidence suggests these are insufficient to protect human rights defenders operating under dangerous, repressive authoritarian State surveillance. The paradox emerges wherein WhatsApp’s very success in enabling rights defense “in places where the ability to communicate securely is critical to someone’s safety” makes it a primary target for authoritarian State intervention through both technical and legal mechanisms. The question here is, what happens when that safety is not only existential to the activist and user, but to those broader national aspirations of the affected groups, emerging as a kind of class vulnerability in this context. Therein greater protection ought to come under different human rights protection from discrimination provisions, cognizant of the victimization of a certain protected class and even worse so when faced with the very real physical danger this vulnerable group suffers in the society at large.

III. WhatsApp subverted into a Taliban surveillance tool: A double-Edged Paradox

While WhatsApp’s architecture incorporates significant privacy protections, both its policy and technical infrastructure contain inherent vulnerabilities that can compromise rights defenders in high-risk environments.

A.   Platform vulnerabilities that function to undermine human rights and and their defenders

1.     Technical Vulnerabilities

The platform’s data-retention framework creates significant risks for human rights defenders. Despite WhatsApp’s assertion that “we do not retain your messages in the ordinary course of providing our Services,” the Privacy Policy outlines several crucial exceptions. Undelivered messages are “stored in encrypted form on our servers for up to 30 days,” while media forwarding requires temporary server storage “to aid in more efficient delivery.”[47] In contexts of authoritarian State surveillance, as demonstrated in the film, these retention periods can create windows of vulnerability where State actors can exploit legal mechanisms to access stored data. It should be noted as a feminist point, that in democratic contexts, domestic human rights law stalking and harassment provisions prohibit surveillance and interference with individuals’ privacy in telecommunications even from those who are approximated in the position which may excuse this violatory access i.e. spouses under community of property. And yet, as is the greater paradox in international law, these protections do not exist when the State is that actor, which is exacerbated by the point that this interference and inevitable rights encroachments takes place under the same metric of patriarchal entitlement to women’s inner lives.

WhatsApp’s device linkage mechanisms present particularly acute risks for human rights defenders in such high-risk situations. The privacy policy acknowledges that WhatsApp collects “device and connection-specific information” including “hardware model, operating system information, battery level, signal strength, app version, browser information, mobile network, connection information.”[48] This comprehensive device fingerprinting, while useful for service provision, enables sophisticated surveillance through device correlation. The film reveals how authorities exploit these linkages to map activist networks when devices are seized. And further so when securitocratic corroboration by these technical tools create a greater pool of vulnerable individuals, now criminalized as agents of insurrection, as a cruel irony to this disjointed or warping of the vulnerable to the offender.

The problem of metadata

Moreover, the metadata exposure represents perhaps the most significant technical vulnerability. While WhatsApp emphasises message encryption, the platform necessarily processes what it terms “usage and log information,” including “information about your activity (including how you use our Services, your Services settings, how you interact with others using our Services).”[49] This metadata, containing patterns of communication, temporal markers, and network relationships, enables comprehensive surveillance without breaking encryption.[50] The Privacy Policy acknowledges that WhatsApp collects “the time, frequency, and duration of your activities and interactions,”[51]creating detailed behavioural profiles that can compromise entire resistance networks, as was the case in the film.[52] A compromise of the individual’s and group’s safety for, in importantly, negotiated compromise between Tech and State. This paper makes the argument that WhatsApp and others of its like themselves enjoy power as mutli-national corporations and that the leveraging of that power in the essentiality of their services ought to inform the strategy in their relations with States. Network-mapping capabilities emerge from the intersection of these vulnerabilities. For example, the platform’s group functionality, while crucial for organising, creates what the privacy policy describes as “information about the groups and broadcast lists” that then becomes associated with user accounts.[53] This system, structural data, combined with metadata and device linkages, enables sophisticated network analysis, and as evidenced in the documentary, authorities can reconstruct entire organisational structures through these digital traces and fingerprints, transforming the platform’s social architecture into a surveillance tool, in a dystopic Orwellian[54]reality. Therein the true, independence, impartiality and neutrality of platforms like WhatsApp are undermined in this exercise as an inversion of their claim to corporate private independence and into a transformation into essential state agents in the apparatus of the practices of repressive regimes in these environments. This creates an interesting failure in the promise of liberal capitalism that has proven so essential to the stated ideological makeup/contexts of these companies. I would then ask, what is free(dom) in this exercise of the free market.

The case of Israel’s use of the Lavender AI system to commit its Euro-and-American-funded genocide[55] in Gaza is instructive here. Lavender AI is an AI military targetting decision system, which reportedly incorporates WhatsApp group data in its targeting decisions. It selects military targets based on membership in certain WhatsApp groups that have been identified by the IDF as sufficiently associated with the Palestinian liberation movement, Hamas.[56] This starkly illustrates how digital platforms (specifically WhatsApp) can simultaneously enable and undermine human rights and their defenders. Where civilians are suspected to be part of an identified WhatsApp group, they are targetted with military force. Lobby efforts may make this point in the contradiction of what is framed as facilitating social harmony and cohesion, such as social networking platforms, now as an instrument of violence particularly as activists such as those in the documentary have not entered into the ‘social contract’ of violence. Wherein peaceful and peace-loving communication becomes the site of physical harm, reputational damage, and arbitrary/summary/ false (without cause) criminal brutalization. The disjuncture of engaging in activity that is not criminal such as free speech in private communication as itself criminalizing. This framing, I believe should ostensibly go some way to shaping some of the discourse on social networking in environments such as these, at the least  companies may face a commercial or user chilling effect instead, as it were.

One of the key inputs for this system is alleged to be membership in WhatsApp groups containing suspected militants.[57] This practice raises serious concerns about privacy, due process, and the right to life. The use of WhatsApp group data for military targeting decisions demonstrates how a platform designed to facilitate communication and organisation can be weaponised against the very communities it serves. While WhatsApp emphasises its end-to-end encryption and claims to have “no backdoors,”[58] the use of WhatsApp group membership data in targeting decisions raises serious concerns about the extent of metadata available to State actors and the potential for its misuse, often with fatal results. That is, to the extent to which they allow “no back doors” but their own.

The implications of these vulnerabilities extend beyond individual privacy breaches to systemic compromises of human rights and liberation movements, through the co-opting of these platforms. The film demonstrates how WhatsApp’s technical vulnerabilities translate into real-world risks for those defending human rights, with device seizures and metadata analysis leading to identification and targeting of activists, true or not. This suggests a fundamental tension between WhatsApp’s commercial architecture and the security requirements of human rights defenders in high risk or conflict zones, challenging prevailing assumptions about the universal applicability of standard boilerplate platform security models. Instead it reveals an inherent contradiction of privacy policy as protection and programming as incrimination, the injury lessened no less by the product and or price point as a service that is free. More than post-purchase dissonance I would argue that should this continue; it is in the interests of companies like Meta to avoid this post-purchase destruction or a user’s post-purchase descent.

2.     Legal and Policy Challenges

The terms of service present fundamental challenges for human rights defenders. WhatsApp’s requirement that users “access and use our Services only for legal, authorised, and acceptable purposes” creates inherent tensions in contexts where human rights defense is criminalised.[59] The terms explicitly permit WhatsApp to “take appropriate action” including “contacting law enforcement” when detecting violations, a mechanism that can be weaponised by authoritarian regimes.[60] As demonstrated in Shot the Voice of Freedom, this creates a paradox in which legitimate human rights defence activities can, in a cruel irony, trigger platform enforcement actions. Further, the privacy policy explicitly states that WhatsApp will share information “if we have a good-faith belief that it is necessary to: (a) respond pursuant to applicable law or regulations, legal process, or government requests.”[61]

Such a broad compliance framework, while appropriate for functioning legal systems based on the rule of law, becomes problematic in contexts where legal mechanisms are themselves tools of repression or the norms they protect are categorically, by international law provisions,  anti-democratic. Furthermore, the privacy policy acknowledges that WhatsApp “shares information globally, both internally within the Meta Companies and externally with our partners and service providers.”[62] This global data architecture, while useful for service operations, creates multiple points of legal exposure. Meta’s corporate integration requirements further complicate these challenges; the Terms provide that WhatsApp “works with partners, service providers, and affiliated companies” requiring data sharing for operational purposes. This corporate eco-system expands the attack surface for legal demands, as pressure on any part of Meta’s or its partners’s infrastructure can compromise WhatsApp users in a kind of Kafkaesque[63] obscure, bureaucratic system of exclusion, gatekeeping (of competing services) and simultaneous incrimination (of users). The latter combination being the more macabre. The film demonstrates how this corporate integration enables authorities to triangulate user information through multiple legal access points as a duplicity in neoliberalism in both proliferation and inequity or said more generously, a  disjuncture in values.

Moreover, the platform’s enforcement architecture creates multiple exposure risks for user data, in the face of State surveillance. For instance, WhatsApp’s privacy policy explicitly permits information sharing when necessary “to detect, investigate, prevent, or address fraud and other illegal activity, security, or technical issues.” This broad mandate enables what the Terms describe as “appropriate action,” including proactive reporting to State authorities. This way, these exposure provisions within the terms of service create additional vulnerabilities through their reporting mechanisms. In addition, other users can also “report other users’ interactions and messages,” while WhatsApp may “provide information to law enforcement.”[64] This dual-layer reporting system, while approporiate for most democtratic jursidictions that are subject to rule of law, they enable authoritarian State actors to exploit legitimate platform governance mechanisms for surveillance purposes where the exposure of the infrastructure constitutes direct exposure to risk for the user.As evidenced in Shot the Voice of Freedom, these provisions can inadvertanly create what amounts to a legitimised surveillance infrastructure for State actors – in this case, the Taliban. Standard platform governance models, designed for stable democratic jurisdictions, prove inadequate in contexts in which legal frameworks themselves become instruments of repression. This suggests a need for fundamental reconsideration of how platform policies can better protect human rights defenders while maintaining necessary legal compliance. This would mean, at the least the exercise of  the legal ease oft used in other contexts as a narrowing of state oversight as applied here for humanitarian/ humane/ humanist purposes.

The mechanisms through which the Taliban accessed user WhatsApp data of Afghan women activists for forced confessions, as seen in the film, reveal these critical vulnerabilities in WhatsApp’s platform architecture and governance frameworks. While Meta may not officially recognise Taliban authority, the regime’s control of State institutions enables exploitation of what the privacy policy terms “applicable law or regulations, legal process, or government requests.”[65] This demonstrates the unfortunately paradoxical situation where platform data governance policies, designed to comply with legal requirements in democratic contexts such as the GDPR, become instruments of repression under authoritarian State rule – as demonstrated in the film.

The compounding nature of platforms’ technical and policy vulnerabilities creates a cascade effect in undermining resistance networks. Initial access to a single device or account enables authorities to map organisational structures through contact lists, group memberships, and communication patterns. As demonstrated in the film, this systematic exploitation of these platform vulnerabilities transformed WhatsApp’s social infrastructure into a Taliban surveillance apparatus. WhatsApp is not unique in any respect here. Similarly placed digital communication services like Signal, Telegram, and others face similar challenges to the universality of their boilerplate data governance structures. Interestingly WeChat , although characterized,  rightly or not, as originating from a repressive state  may provide reprieve here from other and different State repression. Conversely, it would make sense that governments understood as authoritarian,  such as China, would be likeminded on individual freedoms and yet in an act of geopolitical irony the steadfastness or ‘hostility’ of the Chinese government to alter its platforms, I speculate, may prove more protective of the end user. This may serve to complicate the problem of monopoly.

3.     Commercial Spyware

The emergence of sophisticated commercial spyware presents a significant challenge to WhatsApp’s role as a rights-enabling platform, particularly exemplified by the Israeli NSO Group’s Pegasus technology.[66] Despite WhatsApp’s robust end-to-end encryption for messages in transit, Pegasus represents an endpoint compromise, bypassing encryption through direct device infiltration. The Pegasus Project’s revelations, documented through collaborative investigation by seventeen media organisations,[67] demonstrated that this technological circumvention of platform security has been systematically deployed against rights defenders, journalists, and political figures. While the NSO Group frames Pegasus as a legitimate tool for “combating crime and terror,” the investigation’s findings of 50,000 potentially targeted phone numbers, including numerous human rights defenders and journalists, suggests its deployment primarily serves state surveillance interests.[68] The problematic being, that free platforms like WhatsApp may be the implement that may very well cost users their freedom, even in instances where those ‘crimes’ are not crimes at all in the jurisdictions of the juristic entities.

Herein, I recall the various (self)reporting mechanisms or obligations of these entities and wonder if there may be an argument made to a form of post fact/ remote or passive digital ‘entrapment’.  Where the user is enticed to use a platform under the impression of protection expressed by the service whilst the user unknowingly or unwittingly is exposed to problematic reporting

This tension between commercial spyware capabilities and platform security measures reveals a fundamental vulnerability in WhatsApp’s rights-enabling architecture: while the platform can secure message transmission, it cannot fully protect against sophisticated endpoint compromises. The reported targeting of French President Emmanuel Macron alongside rights defenders illustrates the technology’s dual deployment against both high-profile political figures and grassroots activists, suggesting a broader pattern of surveillance that transcends traditional security justifications and directly perhaps challenges WhatsApp’s very mission of enabling secure communication for democracy and human rights defense.[69]

IV. Legal Framework and Context

A.   Digital rights protection under international human rights law

The evolution of digital rights protection in international human rights law reflects the complex challenge of applying established human rights frameworks to rapidly evolving technological contexts. Initially conceived through the lens of traditional civil and political rights,[70] digital rights protection has emerged as a distinct yet integrated domain within international human rights law.[71] The UN Human Rights Council’s landmark Resolution 20/8 in 2012 marked a crucial development, affirming that “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online.”[72] This principle, while seemingly straightforward, requires substantial theoretical and practical elaboration to address the unique characteristics of digital spaces.

The emergence of digital platforms as essential infrastructure for rights exercise has necessitated a reconceptualisation of state obligations under international human rights law. Traditional state duties to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights have acquired new dimensions in digital spaces, particularly regarding positive obligations to ensure rights protection in platform-mediated environments. This evolution is reflected in the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34, which explicitly addresses state obligations regarding new forms of media.[73]

1.     Applicable international legal frameworks

The protection of human rights in this context draws upon multiple, intersecting international legal frameworks, each contributing distinct elements to the overall architecture of applicable human rights protections in the unfolding situation in Afghanistan. The foundational framework remains the International Bill of Human Rights, comprising the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR.[74] The application of these traditional human rights frameworks to digital contexts has been substantially elaborated through the work of treaty bodies and special procedures. The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34 provides authoritative interpretation of Article 19 ICCPR’s application to digital communication,[75] while General Comment No. 37 specifically addresses the right of peaceful assembly in digital spaces.[76] These interpretative instruments have established that restrictions on digital rights must meet the strict requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality under Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.

Complementing these core human rights instruments, specialised frameworks have emerged to address digital-specific challenges. The Council of Europe’s Convention 108+ represents the first binding international instrument that explicitly protects individual rights in the context of digital data processing.[77] Similarly, the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection provides regional standards for digital rights protection.[78]

 Although not universally binding, these instruments have influenced the development of international standards for digital rights protection. The business and human rights framework, particularly the UNGPs, provides crucial guidance for platform governance. The UNGPs’ three pillars – State duty to protect, corporate responsibility to respect, and access to remedy – have been specifically elaborated for digital contexts through the B-Tech Project of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.[79] This framework becomes particularly relevant when examining platform policies in conflict zones, where corporate responsibilities may need to be heightened due to elevated human rights risks.  The elephant in the room in this regard being, private security companies impunity/immunity in conflict situations. It  cannot be lost that these electronic security measures and software’s now form that agent anew in the digital space. However I still make the point that the buck stops with telecommunications as the responsible agent to the end user.

Recent developments in international law have begun to address emerging digital rights challenges. The Human Rights Council’s resolutions on privacy in the digital age[80] and the promotion and protection of human rights on the Internet[81] have established important principles for digital rights protection. These include the prohibition of arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy through digital surveillance, the importance of encryption and anonymity for the exercise of human rights, and the necessity of protecting human rights defenders who use digital tools.

2.     State obligations in digital space

State obligations in digital space derive from the established human rights framework of respect, protect, and fulfill, but acquire distinct characteristics when applied to digital environments. Under international human rights law, States bear primary responsibility for ensuring rights protection within their jurisdiction, including in digital spaces. These obligations encompass both negative duties to refrain from rights violations and positive obligations to ensure rights protection, particularly relevant in platform-mediated environments.[82]

The Human Rights Committee has elaborated specific state obligations regarding digital rights, including duties to ensure universal internet access, protect privacy in digital communications, prevent arbitrary surveillance, and enable the exercise of fundamental freedoms online.[83] These obligations extend to protecting individuals from rights violations by third parties, including private actors, through appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures.[84] Particularly relevant is the obligation to protect against business-related human rights abuses in digital space, as articulated in the UNGPs.[85]

The Taliban’s case presents unique challenges in applying this framework. While the Taliban exercises de factocontrol over Afghanistan’s territory, their status as an unrecognised government raises complex questions about the application of international obligations. However, as the European Court of Human Rights established in Cyprus v Turkey, effective control of territory carries with it the obligation to secure human rights protection, regardless of the legitimacy of the authority exercising control.[86] This principle suggests that the Taliban’s exercise of territorial control creates obligations regarding digital rights protection, despite their lack of international recognition. As it is in particular their effective control of state entities and authorities that constitutes state liability internationally and so then this ought to translate to domestic accountability as framed above.

Evidence from Shot the Voice of Freedom demonstrates systematic violations of these obligations. The Taliban’s actions – including internet shutdowns, surveillance of digital communications, and exploitation of platform vulnerabilities – directly contravene State obligations to respect digital rights. Their access of user WhatsApp data through device seizures and forced confessions violate obligations to protect privacy in digital communications, as articulated in Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 16.[87] These actions particularly impact women’s rights defenders, creating intersectional violations that engage both general human rights obligations and specific protections under CEDAW.[88]

If I may be permitted to digress in and on the gender lens, the act of confession is an interesting one. It connotes the notion that women’s privacy (here read secrets) are subversive and dangerous whilst simultaneously demanding a silencing of their voice. The confessional, although internationally understood better in the Roman Catholic sense presents a kind of revelation of moral wrongs. I argue it is a unique, cruel and degrading practice in its moralistic implications for a higher wrongdoing and not just of a criminal legal sense. I would argue that this creates a special punishment which ironically or not, is devoid of the kind of remedial and elevating aspect confession implies and so scholarship may benefit from feminist methodologies in understanding this practice of confession to legal and cultural insurrection. An intersectional view to the Convention Against Torture prove useful to understanding the punishment in its more nuanced  and I would argue more sophisticated sense of repression especially in light of what is a greater effect of the more widely understood gender norm to female chastity and modesty and so the violation/ the confession is attenuated into a distinct shaming in the greater public

The situation is further complicated by the Taliban’s explicit rejection of international human rights standards, particularly regarding women’s rights. However, as the International Court of Justice has consistently held, international obligations persist regardless of internal political arrangements or ideological positions.[89] The Taliban’s control of Afghanistan’s digital infrastructure creates specific obligations regarding access to digital services, protection of privacy, and facilitation of fundamental freedoms online.

3.     Corporate Responsibility in Human Rights Protection

The UNGPs,[90] adopted by the UN Human Rights Council through Resolution 17/4 on 16 June 2011, are a set of 31 principles that clarify the duties of governments and the responsibilities of businesses in relation to human rights within the context of business operations.[91] Despite their non-binding nature, the relevance of the UNGPs lies in their widespread recognition as the “authoritative”[92] global standard for responsible business conduct.[93] The Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4 of 16 June 2011.[94]

The UNGPs emphasise the State’s duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including businesses. In the Afghan context, this principle is challenged by the Taliban’s de facto control and their systematic violations of human rights, especially women’s rights. The international community faces difficulties in enforcing human rights standards in Afghanistan principally because of the lack of a recognised State authority adhering to international norms.

WhatsApp, as a business entity, bears a responsibility under the UNGPs to respect human rights, a duty that encompasses conducting human rights due diligence and implementing appropriate policies and processes.[95]However, in the context of Afghanistan, this responsibility is rendered particularly complex due to the platform’s pivotal role in facilitating communication for women’s rights defenders, the potential for its misuse by the Taliban for surveillance, and the challenges of operating in an environment where standard policies may inadvertently compromise user safety.[96] The UNGPs emphasise the need for enhanced due diligence in conflict-affected areas, which for WhatsApp could entail developing rapid-response mechanisms to protect users, implementing more granular privacy settings, and creating specialised teams familiar with the Afghan context to handle reports and content moderation decisions.[97] While the UNGPs provide a valuable framework for addressing the human rights implications of digital platforms in Afghanistan, their effective implementation faces significant challenges in the context of an authoritarian regime with limited recognition of international human rights standards.[98]

These Guiding Principles are the closest framework that we currently have under international law for businesses to respect human rights, including non-discrimination. The Guidelines emphasise three foundational principles, supported by a number of pillars and operational principles: Protect, Respect, and Remedy.

Duty to Protect

First, the foundational principle that States’ are the primary duty bearers under international human rights law, in terms of which they are required to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of individuals within their territory or jurisdiction. This includes the duty to protect against human rights abuse by third parties, including business enterprises. This is trite international law. The State’s duty to protect human rights operates as an obligation of  (lawful? Good?) conduct and due diligence, signifying that states are not automatically liable for human rights abuses committed by private actors. However, a State can be held accountable under international human rights law if such abuses can be attributed to them, or if they fail to take adequate measures to prevent, investigate, punish, and redress such abuses. While states retain discretion in determining the specific actions to fulfil this duty, they are expected to consider the full spectrum of permissible preventive and remedial measures, encompassing policies, legislation, regulations, and adjudication.[99]

While the Taliban’s actions clearly violate human rights norms, the UNGPs also emphasise the state’s duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business enterprises. In this context, the international community and legitimate Afghan government-in-exile have a role in setting clear expectations for digital platforms operating in high-risk or conflict zones and developing legal frameworks that balance the protection of digital rights with legitimate aims of addressing illegal activities online.

Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights

Secondly, the UNGPs underscore the role of business enterprises as specialised entities within society, tasked with specific functions, to adhere to all applicable laws and respect human rights throughout their operations. This responsibility to respect human rights is characterised as a “global standard of conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate,” emphasising its universality and independence from state action or national legal frameworks.[100] Furthermore, the UNGPs mandate that businesses take adequate measures to prevent, mitigate, and remediate adverse human rights impacts.[101] Specifically, at Principle 17, the guidelines provide that “business enterprises should carry out human rights due diligence” and defines the parameters for such a human rights due diligence[102], which entails assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed.[103]

WhatsApp, as a business entity, has a responsibility under the UNGPs to respect human rights. This includes conducting human rights due diligence to identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for how they address their impacts on human rights, and implement policies and processes appropriate to their size and circumstances.[104] In the Afghan context, this would require WhatsApp to assess the heightened risks to users under Taliban rule and implement enhanced safeguards to protect user data and privacy.

The UNGPs emphasise that businesses operating in conflict-affected areas such as Afghanistan should conduct enhanced due diligence.[105] For WhatsApp, this could involve developing rapid-response mechanisms to protect users when threats are identified, implementing more granular privacy settings that allow users to control the visibility of their online activity, particularly in group chats crucial for organising resistance efforts, and creating specialised teams familiar with the local Afghan context to handle reports and content moderation decisions related to human rights defenders in the country.

Access to Effective Remedy

Finally, regarding remedies, Principle 22 mandates that businesses, upon identifying their contribution to adverse human rights impacts, should provide or cooperate in remediation through legitimate processes. The commentary specifically mentions “operational-level grievance mechanisms” as an effective means of enabling remediation for those potentially affected by a business’s activities.[106]

The UNGPs stress the importance of access to remedies when human rights abuses occur. This principle is particularly relevant in the case of forced confessions obtained using WhatsApp data. The company should cooperate with legitimate processes to provide remedies to victims, which could include assisting in investigations of forced confessions.

Furthermore, Principle 25, a foundational principle, obligates States to take “appropriate steps” to ensure access to effective remedy for individuals whose human rights are adversely impacted by business activities within their territory and/or jurisdiction. Principle 26 of the UNGPs underscores the State’s responsibility to ensure the efficacy of domestic judicial mechanisms in addressing business-related human rights abuses. This entails a proactive approach to reducing legal, practical, and other barriers that could hinder access to remedies.[107] The accompanying commentary emphasises the pivotal role of effective judicial mechanisms in ensuring access to remedies, while also acknowledging the essential complementary role of administrative, legislative, and other non-judicial mechanisms, with national human rights institutions singled out as playing a particularly important role in this regard.[108] National human rights institutions, with their mandate to promote and protect human rights, can also play a crucial role in monitoring platforms, raising awareness of potential harm and vulnerability to rights defenders, and advocating effective remedies for those who have been harmed.[109]

Finally, as a general principle, the UNGPs state that their implementation should be non-discriminatory, with a specific focus on the rights and needs of individuals from groups or populations that are at heightened risk of vulnerability or marginalisation. This includes particular attention to the distinct challenges these groups may face and calls for recognising the differing risks experienced by women and men. This implies that businesses and governments must ensure that human rights protections are inclusive and sensitive to the unique circumstances of marginalised communities, taking into account the intersectionality of risks based on gender and other factors.

While not legally binding, the Guiding Principles contribute significantly to evolving legal and ethical frameworks for businesses. As noted earlier, the situation in Afghanistan highlights significant challenges in implementing the UNGPs. There is also a lack of effective international oversight, observed through the absence of robust accountability mechanisms for digital platforms operating in conflict zones, undermining the effectiveness of current protection frameworks.[110]

4.     Protection Gaps in current international legal frameworks

The documentary film illuminates significant protection gaps in the current international legal frameworks. Moreover, existing self-governance frameworks for digital platforms are ill-equipped to address the complex realities of repressive contexts. While initiatives such as UNGPs provide a foundation for corporate responsibility, they lack the binding force necessary to compel platforms to adapt their policies in high-risk environments.

Moreover, current international frameworks fail to establish clear accountability mechanisms for digital platforms operating in conflict or high risk zones. This lack of accountability is exacerbated by the absence of effective international oversight bodies capable of holding platforms accountable for their impact on human rights in diverse global contexts. The case study of Afghan women’s use of WhatsApp for resistance demonstrates the urgent need for a more nuanced approach to digital platform regulation, one that is alive to different risk conditions in different contexts; frameworks that can balance the protection of user privacy and freedom of expression with the imperative to prevent platforms from being exploited by repressive regimes. As the documentary shows, the stakes of these protection gaps are not merely theoretical but have real, often life-threatening consequences for human rights defenders operating in hostile environments.

   V.  Power Analysis

The complex interplay between WhatsApp, the Taliban regime, and women’s rights defenders in Afghanistan highlights the tripartite power dynamics that shape the digital rights landscape in the country. This dynamic reveals both the potential and perils of digital platforms in repressive contexts. WhatsApp has emerged as a crucial platform for Afghan women to organise and amplify their voices against Taliban oppression. The app’s end-to-end encryption and widespread adoption make it valuable for coordinating protests and securely sharing information. Women’s rights defenders use WhatsApp groups, some with hundreds of members, to plan demonstrations and maintain communication networks. These digital spaces have become vital for sustaining resistance efforts in the face of severe restrictions on women’s public participation.

While digital platforms enable resistance, they also create vulnerabilities that the Taliban exploits. The regime reportedly used WhatsApp to identify and target activists. This dual nature of digital tools presents a significant challenge for women’s rights defenders, who must balance the need for visibility and coordination with the imperative to protect their identities and networks. The Taliban’s approach to digital platforms is paradoxical. Despite initially banning the Internet during their previous rule, they now embrace social media to broadcast their messages and attack critics.[111] This shift in strategy demonstrates the regime’s growing awareness of the power of digital platforms to shape public opinion and maintain control.

WhatsApp, as a platform provider, in turn faces a complex set of challenges in navigating the Afghan context. The company must balance its global policies and legal obligations with the need to protect user privacy and safety in a repressive environment. This dilemma is exemplified by the potential conflict between WhatsApp’s commitment to user privacy through end-to-end encryption and the pressure to comply with applicable laws or respond to human rights concerns. Despite these risks, Afghan women valiantly continue to leverage WhatsApp and other digital platforms for their resistance efforts. They have moved protests indoors and online as violent crackdowns have increased, using social media to document their opposition to Taliban policies.[112] This digital resistance allows women’s rights defenders to maintain visibility and pressure on the international community, even as physical protests become more dangerous. The tension between these three actors – WhatsApp, the Taliban, and women’s rights defenders – underscores the broader challenges of protecting digital rights in high-risk or conflict zones.

VI. Conclusion

This analysis of WhatsApp’s dual role in Afghan women’s resistance, as documented in Shot the Voice of Freedom, reveals fundamental tensions in digital platform governance and human rights protection in high risk or conflict zones. The film’s vivid portrayal of forced confessions based on WhatsApp data demonstrates a platform weaponization, the scythe of securitisation as it were – the systematic transformation of digital infrastructure from human rights enablers to authoritarian surveillance apparatus. This process illuminates how platform governance frameworks, originally conceived for democratic jurisdictions with robust data protection regimes like the GDPR, fundamentally collapse when confronted with authoritarian State power.

An examination of WhatsApp’s platform architecture reveals two theoretical contributions to the discourse. First, the documentary evidence of Taliban exploitation of standard platform policies demonstrates a governance inversion, where mechanisms designed for user protection become tools of repression. As shown in the Sisters’ experience with device seizures and network mapping, this inversion operates through both technical and legal channels.

Second, and perhaps most significantly, the case advances the understanding of what we might term “differential vulnerability” in digital rights protection. The film’s evidence of systematic targeting of women rights defenders through platform data demonstrates how standard security measures prove inadequate for users facing heightened risks. As shown in the scenes of activists attempting to protect their networks while maintaining necessary coordination, this creates a frustrating security vs. functionality tension in human rights defence.

As evidenced in the film, WhatsApp’s institutional commitment to security through encryption creates complex tensions when confronted with State surveillance capabilities that exploit other platform vulnerabilities. A critical reading of Whatsapp’s Privacy Policy and Terms of Service reveals tensions between these boilerplate standard privacy protection and high risk, conflict zone requirements. While the platform’s architecture incorporates important protective measures, the documentary evidence suggests these are insufficient to protect human rights defenders operating under dangerous, repressive authoritarian State surveillance. The paradox emerges where WhatsApp’s very success in enabling rights defense “in places where the ability to communicate securely is critical to someone’s safety”[113] makes it a primary target for authoritarian State intervention through both technical and legal mechanisms.

Looking forward, this analysis suggests the need for a contextual platform governance approach that recognises and responds to varying levels of risk and repression while maintaining consistent human rights protection. As demonstrated in the documentary’s portrayal of resistance networks adapting to surveillance threats, this requires both technical and policy innovation. The transformation of WhatsApp from a resistance tool to a surveillance mechanism in Afghanistan serves as a warning about the increasing complexities of platform governance in contemporary conflicts. The courage of Afghan women’s rights defenders continuing their resistance despite the personal cost, often occasioned by these vulnerabilities, underscores the urgency of addressing thee paradoxical irony, where digital tools simultaneously enable and endanger human rights defence.

References

[1] ‘Afghanistan Three Years after the Taliban Takeover | Crisis Group’ (14 August 2024) <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistan-three-years-after-taliban-takeover> accessed 9 January 2025.

[2] ‘Shot the Voice of Freedom (2024) | IDFA Festival’ (IDFA) <https://www.idfa.nl/> accessed 9 January 2025.

[3] UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ (2018) UN Doc A/HRC/38/35, available at https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/38/35

[4] This was revealed in an interview with the director, Zainab Entezar, at the end of the screening of the human rights movie festival, in Vienna, on 8 December 2024.

[5] Nassir Ul Haq Wani, ‘Decoding Social Media’s Role in the Resurgence of the Taliban: A Literature Review’ (2023) MPRA Paper No 121874, Available at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/121874/1/MPRA_paper_121874.pdf

[6] ‘World Report 2024: Afghanistan | Human Rights Watch’ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/afghanistan> accessed 9 January 2025.

[7] ‘Three Years of Taliban Rule and International Inaction for Afghans’ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/08/afghanistan-three-years-of-taliban-rule-and-international-inaction-have-left-afghan-community-with-little-hope/> accessed 9 January 2025.

[8] ‘Sanctions, Travel Bans on Taliban Resulting in Afghanistan Being “Ruptured from International Community”, Special Representative Warns Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases’ <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15824.doc.htm> accessed 9 January 2025.

[9] ‘Three Years of Taliban Rule and International Inaction for Afghans’ (n 7); ‘World Report 2024: Afghanistan | Human Rights Watch’ (n 6).

[10] Ibid.

[11] This was revealed in an interview with the director, Zainab Entezar, at the end of the screening of the human rights movie festival, in Vienna, on 8 December 2024.

[12] ‘Terms of Service’ (WhatsApp.com) <https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/terms-of-service> accessed 9 January 2025; ‘Privacy Policy’ (WhatsApp.com) <https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/privacy-policy> accessed 9 January 2025.

[13] Privacy Policy (n 14).

[14] The use of forced confessions, particularly those extracted through digital surveillance and device seizure, constitutes multiple violations of fundamental human rights under international law. The ICCPR explicitly prohibits forced confessions through Article 14(3)(g), which guarantees the right “not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt.” Additionally, such practices violate Article 7 of the ICCPR, which prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

[15] ‘Terms of Service’ (n 12).

[16] ‘Privacy Policy’ (n 12).

[17] See Articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (“UDHR”)

[18] ‘The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ <https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/the-un-guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights-9781800375666.html> accessed 14 September 2024.

[19] Shot the Voice of Freedom (n 2).

[20] ‘WhatsApp Head Will Cathcart: The Spyware Industry Is Undermining Freedom – Committee to Protect Journalists’ <https://cpj.org/2021/07/whatsapp-will-cathcart-spyware-undermining-freedom/> accessed 9 January 2025, available at https://cpj.org/2021/07/whatsapp-will-cathcart-spyware-undermining-freedom/

[21] ibid.

[22] International Commission of Jurists, ‘Digital Technologies and Human Rights: A Legal Framework’ (ICJ 2022), available at https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Digital-Technologies-and-Human-Rights-Briefing-Paper-FINAL-VERSION-May-2022.pdf

[23] Perhaps a form of “digital resistance infrastructure”, where encrypted communication platforms become essential tools for rights defence in authoritarian contexts.

[24] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (“ICCPR”).

[25] Shot the Voice of Freedom (n 2).

[26] ‘Afghanistan: Cats Have More Freedom than Women, Says Meryl Streep’ (BBC News, 24 September 2024) <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr54d3qd5r7o> accessed 9 January 2025; ‘UN Women Deeply Concerned by New Afghanistan Morality Law’ (UN Women – Headquarters, 28 August 2024) <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news-stories/statement/2024/08/un-women-deeply-concerned-by-new-afghanistan-morality-law> accessed 9 January 2025.

[27] ‘Terms of Service’ (n 12); ‘Privacy Policy’ (n 12).

[28] UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/29/32; ‘Human Rights, Encryption and Anonymity in a Digital Age’ (“OHCHR”) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2015/06/human-rights-encryption-and-anonymity-digital-age> accessed 9 January 2025.

[29] WhatsApp, ‘Terms of Service’ (2021) Section “About Our Services”

[30] UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment No 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of Opinion and Expression)’ (2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34

[31] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association’ (17 May 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/41/41

[32] Big Brother Watch and Others v United Kingdom App nos 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15 (ECtHR, 25 May 2021). In this case the Court held that…

[33] London Policing Ethics Panel, ‘Final Report on Live Facial Recognition’ (May 2019).

[34] R (on the application of Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2020] EWCA Civ 1058.

[35] UNHRC, ‘Statement from the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association: Recommendations for Universities Worldwide; Safeguarding the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association on campuses in the context of international solidarity with the Palestinian people and victims’ (2 October 2024); Available at https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/20241004-stm-sr-association.pdf

[36] ‘Terms of Service’ (n 12); ‘Privacy Policy’ (n 12).

[37] In the documentary film, there is a scene where a girl who had earlier been participating in a protest that got violently dispersed by the Taliban was located using WhatsApp messages and calls, and her safety was facilitated through the platform.

[38] UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 37 on Article 21 (Right of Peaceful Assembly)’ (2020) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37

[39] Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, App nos 48226/10 and 14027/11 (ECtHR, 1 December 2015).

[40] ‘Terms of Service’ (n 12).

[41] OHCHR ‘Digital Evidence and Human Rights Documentation’ (2020) Technical Guidance Series

[42] UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment No 37: Article 21 (Right of Peaceful Assembly)’ (2020) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37

[43] ‘Terms of Service’ (n 12); ‘Privacy Policy’ (n 12).

[44] Ibid.

[45] Here the platform requires “accurate information” for registration and implements verification through “text messages and phone calls (from us or our third-party providers) with codes to register for our Services.”

[46] ‘Terms of Service’ (n 12); ‘Privacy Policy’ (n 12).

[47] See WhatsApp’s Terms of Service and Privacy Policy.

[48] See WhatsApp’s Privacy Policy, 2021.

[49] See WhatsApp’s Privacy Policy, 2021.

[50] ‘Human Rights, Encryption and Anonymity in a Digital Age’ (n 28).

[51] See WhatsApp’s Privacy Policy, 2021.

[52] This account was shared by the Director of the film, who gave a brief presentation and answered questions related to the film on 8 December 2024 at the screening of the film, as part of the Human Rights Festival.

[53] See WhatsApp’s Privacy Policy, 2021.

[54] Orwell, G. (2013). Nineteen Eighty-four. United States: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

[55] At the time of writing, there is overwhelming evidence that Israel is committing a genocide in Gaza. This genocide has found political and economic support in the European Union and the United States of America – both of whom are complicity in the genocide of innocent civilians in Gaza, lasting for over 1 year at the time of writing.

[56] ‘Lavender: Israel Offers Glimpse into Terrifying World of Military AI – The Washington Post’ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/05/israel-idf-lavender-ai-militarytarget/> accessed 9 January 2025; Bethan McKernan and Harry Davies, ‘“The Machine Did It Coldly”: Israel Used AI to Identify 37,000 Hamas Targets’ The Guardian (3 April 2024) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-gaza-ai-database-hamas-airstrikes> accessed 29 June 2024.

[57] Ibid.

[58] ‘WhatsApp Head Will Cathcart: The Spyware Industry Is Undermining Freedom – Committee to Protect Journalists’ (n 20).

[59] ‘Terms of Service’ (n 12).

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] ‘Privacy Policy’ (n 12).

[63] Before the Law. (2023). (n.p.): Strelbytskyy Multimedia Publishing.

[64] ibid; ‘Terms of Service’ (n 12).

[65] ‘Privacy Policy’ (n 12); ‘Terms of Service’ (n 12).

[66] ‘NSO GROUP – Cyber Intelligence for Global Security and Stability’ <https://www.nsogroup.com/> accessed 9 January 2025; ‘US Judge Finds Israel’s NSO Group Liable for Hacking in WhatsApp Lawsuit | Reuters’ <https://www.reuters.com/technology/cybersecurity/us-judge-finds-israels-nso-group-liable-hacking-whatsapp-lawsuit-2024-12-21/> accessed 9 January 2025.

[67] Amnesty International, The Pegasus Project: One year on, spyware crisis continues after failure to clamp down on surveillance industry, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/07/the-pegasus-project-one-year-on-spyware-crisis-continues-after-failure-to-clamp-down-on-surveillance-industry/

[68] Ibid.

[69] Reuters, ‘France’s Macron Targeted in Project Pegasus Spyware Case – Le Monde’ Le Monde (Paris, 21 July 2021), https://www.reuters.com/technology/french-prosecutor-opens-probe-after-pegasus-spyware-complaint-2021-07-20/

[70] See also Article 19, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).

[71] For instance, in the landmark Resolution 20/8, the HRC notes “that the exercise of human rights, in particular the right to freedom of expression, on the Internet is an issue of increasing interest and importance as the rapid pace of technological development enables individuals all over the world to use new information and communications technologies,…”

[72] At para 1, the Council “Affirms that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice, in accordance with articles 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Available at https://www.right-docs.org/doc/a-hrc-res-20-8/#:~:text=Decides%20to%20continue%20its%20consideration,rights%2C%20in%20accordance%20with%20its

[73] UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of Opinion and Expression)’ (2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34

[74] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).

[75] UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment No 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of Opinion and Expression)’ (2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34

[76] UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment No 37: Article 21 (Right of Peaceful Assembly)’ (2020) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37.

[77] Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (adopted 28 January 1981, entered into force 1 October 1985) ETS 108

[78] African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (adopted 27 June 2014), https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-cyber-security-and-personal-data-protection

[79] OHCHR, ‘B-Tech Project’ https://www.ohchr.org/en/business/b-tech-project accessed 4 January 2024

[80] UNHRC Res 48/4 (7 October 2021) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/48/4

[81] UNHRC Res 47/16 (26 July 2021) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/47/16

[82] UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General comment no. 31 [80], The nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, https://www.refworld.org/legal/general/hrc/2004/en/52451 [accessed 04 January 2025]

[83] UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment No 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of Opinion and Expression)’ (2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34, https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/general-comments-and-recommendations/general-comment-no34-article-19-freedoms-opinion-and

[84] UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ (2018) UN Doc A/HRC/38/35.

[85] UN Human Rights Council ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31

[86] Cyprus v Turkey App no 25781/94 (ECtHR, 10 May 2001)

[87] UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment No 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy)’ (1988) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9

[88] UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13, 18 December 1979, https://www.refworld.org/legal/agreements/unga/1979/en/13757 [accessed 09 January 2025]

[89] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14

[90] The UN Guiding Principles in the Age of Technology: A B-Tech Foundational Paper (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Business/B-Tech/introduction-ungp-age-technology.pdf accessed 29 June 2024.

[91] The Special Representative annexed the Guiding Principles to his final report to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/17/31), and the Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4 of 16 June 2011; Andreas Rasche and Sandra Waddock, ‘The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility Research’ (2021) 6(2) Business and Human Rights Journal 227-240 https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2021.2 accessed 29 June 2024.

[92] ‘About Business and Human Rights | Australian Human Rights Commission’ <https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/business-and-human-rights/about-business-and-human-rights> accessed 14 September 2024.

[93] The 2018 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct highlights the importance of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, along with the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises.

[94] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Resolution 17/4: Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (6 July 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4 https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/g11/144/71/pdf/g1114471.pdf  accessed 29 June 2024.

[95] Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, Principles 11-15

[96] Nathalie Maréchal and Rebecca MacKinnon, ‘Human Rights and Digital Technology’ (2022) 22 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 375, 388-390.

[97] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Business and Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Regions: Challenges and Options for State Responses’ (2020) UN Doc A/75/212, paras 18-22.

[98] Anita Ramasastry, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap Between Responsibility and Accountability’ (2015) 14 Journal of Human Rights 237, 245-247.

[99] Barnali Choudhury (ed), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Commentary (Elgar Commentaries in Human Rights, Edward Elgar Publishing 2023); ‘The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (n 18).

[100] Guiding Principle 11; Choudhury (ed), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2023).

[101] Choudhury (ed), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2023).

[102] Principles 18 through 21 elaborate on essential components of due diligence.

[103] Rasche and Waddock, ‘The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (2021); The UN Guiding Principles in the Age of Technology: A B-Tech Foundational Paper.

[104] ‘The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (n 18).

[105] Ibid.

[106] According to the Guiding Principles, the term grievance mechanism refers to “any routinized, State-based or non-State-based, judicial or non-judicial process through which grievances concerning business-related human rights abuse can be raised and remedy can be sought.” See also Choudhury (ed), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2023).

[107] Ebert, Fostering Business Respect for Human Rights in AI Governance and Beyond (2024).

[108] Choudhury (ed), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2023).

[109] The UN Guiding Principles in the Age of Technology: A B-Tech Foundational Paper.

[110] UNGA Res 48/134 (20 December 1993) Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles).

[111] Nassir Ul Haq Wani, ‘Decoding Social Media’s Role in the Resurgence of the Taliban: A Literature Review’ (2023) MPRA Paper No 121874, Available at ‘UN Women Deeply Concerned by New Afghanistan Morality Law’ (n 26); ‘Three Years of Taliban Rule and International Inaction for Afghans’ (n 7).

[112] ‘World Report 2024: Afghanistan | Human Rights Watch’ (n 6).;‘UN Women Deeply Concerned by New Afghanistan Morality Law’ (n 26).; ‘Afghanistan: Cats Have More Freedom than Women, Says Meryl Streep’ (n 26).

[113] ‘WhatsApp Head Will Cathcart: The Spyware Industry Is Undermining Freedom – Committee to Protect Journalists’ (n 20).